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Abstract
With a large amount of tasks of various types, requesters
in crowdsourcing platforms often bundle tasks of
different types into a single working session. This
creates a task switching setting, where workers need
to shift between different cognitive tasks. We design
and conduct an experiment on Amazon Mechanical
Turk to study how occasionally presented performance-
contingent monetary rewards, referred as monetary
interventions, affect worker performance in the task
switching setting. We use two competing metrics to
evaluate worker performance. When monetary interven-
tions are placed on some tasks in a working session,
our results show that worker performance on these
tasks can be improved in both metrics. Moreover,
worker performance on other tasks where monetary
interventions are not placed is also affected: workers
perform better according to one metric, but worse
according to the other metric. This suggests that in
addition to providing extrinsic monetary incentives
for some tasks, monetary interventions implicitly set
performance goals for all tasks. Furthermore, monetary
interventions are most effective in improving worker
performance when used at switch tasks, tasks that
follow a task of a different type, in working sessions
with a low task switching frequency.
Introduction
While workers in crowdsourcing platforms often choose to
switch between different types of tasks to diversify their
work or avoid fatigue or boredom, many task switches
are initiated by requesters as a result of the design of
the working sessions. For example, a requester may ask
a worker to identify whether a pre-specified object (e.g.
automobile or person) exists in each of a set of pictures by
grouping the tasks according to the objects of interests; this
results in task switches when the “target” object changes.
Moreover, in many citizen science projects, workers are
asked to go through a few tasks to complete some requested
work. For instance, in Cell Slider1, a worker is shown an
image of blood cells and needs to identify the types of
cells, count the number of irregular cells and then estimate
Copyright c© 2014, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
1http://www.cellslider.net/
the brightness of the stained irregular cell cores; in Citizen
Sort2, a worker classifies the same group of moth pictures
according to shape, color and forewing pattern respectively.
One of the challenges of the requester-initiated task
switching is to ensure work quality of all types of tasks in
a working session. It is well known that workers perform
worse on switch tasks, tasks that follow a task of a different
type, than on repetition tasks, tasks that follow a task of
the same type (Rogers and Monsell 1995; Monsell 2003).
Hence, a working session requiring task switches may result
in lower worker performance on at least some tasks.
In this paper, we study whether and how performance-
contingent monetary rewards can be used to influence work-
er performance in requester-initiated task switching settings.
By “performance-contingent”, we mean that a worker can
only get the reward if her performance meets some pre-
specified criteria. Instead of providing a performance-
contingent reward for every task in a working session, we
consider the impact of occasionally provided performance-
contingent rewards, i.e. they are only placed on a few
selected tasks, on worker performance in working sessions
with requester-initiated task switches. We refer to these
occasionally provided performance-contingent rewards as
monetary interventions.
We conduct a between-subjects experiment with 1268
unique workers from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk).
Each worker is randomly assigned to an experiment
condition where she is asked to complete a sequence of 96
tasks, with two types of tasks interleaving with each other
in the sequence. Experiment conditions vary in either the
task switching frequency or whether and where monetary
interventions are used in the sequence. We adopt two
competing metrics to evaluate worker performance on a
task: reaction time and accuracy. Intuitively, shorter reaction
time is often associated with lower accuracy, ceteris paribus.
When monetary interventions are used in a working
session, the term intervened tasks refers to those tasks where
the interventions are placed and the term non-intervened
tasks refers to other tasks in the session. Our experimental
results show that workers react significantly faster and either
are more accurate or have a larger accuracy improvement
(from previous tasks) at intervened tasks in experiment
2http://www.citizensort.org/
conditions with monetary incentives than at corresponding
tasks in experiment conditions without monetary incentives.
This indicates that extrinsic financial incentives are effective
at improving work quality, even to the extent to somewhat
overcome the tradeoff between two competing performance
metrics. In addition, when monetary interventions are used
in a working session, they have a spillover effect on the
non-intervened tasks in the session — for tasks where
monetary interventions are not placed, workers still shorten
their reaction time to a large degree with a small decrease
in accuracy. Such externality of monetary interventions
can be explained as workers interpreting the performance-
contingency of extra rewards on intervened tasks as an
implicit performance goal, and thus attempting to improve
their performance on all tasks.
Comparing worker performance across experiment con-
ditions, we find that monetary interventions incentivize
overall performance improvement in a working session more
effectively when tasks switch less frequently in the session.
Furthermore, placing monetary interventions at switch tasks
boosts the overall performance more significantly than
introducing them at repetition tasks. These findings suggest
that requesters who wish to elicit high-quality work in a
task switching setting by using monetary rewards should pay
close attention to both how tasks are interleaved and where
to add extra bonuses.
Related Work
Multitasking, task interruption and resumption. Task-
switching is closely related to a few other concepts,
including multitasking, task interruption and resumption.
Multitasking refers to either performing two or more types
of tasks simultaneously or switching back and forth from
one type to another (Salvucci and Taatgen 2010; Salvucci,
Taatgen, and Borst 2009). Our setting in this paper is thus
similar to the latter form of multitasking.
Many studies in the human-computer interaction com-
munity explored task switching from the perspective of
task interruption and resumption. A subject was typically
performing a primary task before being interrupted by a
secondary task, and the effects of the interruption on the
primary task were analyzed (Iqbal and Horvitz 2007; Mark,
Gudith, and Klocke 2008; Bailey and Konstan 2006). Unlike
such work, we care about work quality across all types of
tasks rather than focusing on a single (primary) type of tasks,
and our focus is on the effects of monetary interventions on
worker performance in task switching settings.
Financial incentives in crowdsourcing. Prior work on
the relationship between monetary rewards and work quality
in the context of crowdsourcing was mostly conducted
through experiments in which workers sequentially com-
pleted tasks of the same type. Harris (2011) showed
that workers performed better when offered performance-
contingent financial incentives. In addition, while the
magnitude of financial incentives alone has little effect on
worker performance (Mason and Watts 2010; Rogstadius
et al. 2011; Yin, Chen, and Sun 2013), the changes in the
magnitude of financial incentives over a sequence of tasks
do (Yin, Chen, and Sun 2013).
The effects of monetary rewards on worker performance
in a task switching setting was only studied in the labs.
It was observed that if workers could earn additional
rewards based on their overall performance in a working
session, their performance on switch tasks was improved
marginally (Nieuwenhuis and Monsell 2002). Our work
focuses on interventions that only provide monetary bonuses
on selected tasks.
Switch cost, learning and task specialization. A promi-
nent psychological effect of task switching is observed in
previous studies — workers usually have worse performance
on switch tasks than on repetition tasks (Rogers and
Monsell 1995; Monsell 2003). The performance difference
between the switch and repetition tasks is called the
switch cost, which is likely a result of the costly cognitive
control processes triggered by the task switching (e.g.
shift of attention and retrieval of task goals and rules
into working memory) or task-set inertia, that is, the
proactive interference between the competing old and new
tasks (e.g. persistent activation of the old task and the
involuntary inhabitation of the current task) (Mayr and
Kliegl 2000; Allport, Styles, and Hsieh 1994; Kiesel et al.
2010). It is also known that more frequent task switching
demands more cognitive resources, which may be mentally
taxing or cause information overload for workers (Speier,
Valacich, and Vessey 1999). In contrast, repetition tasks
offer opportunities for workers to develop task-specific
skills and strategies over time as a result of learning and
task specialization and thus may lead to increased work
quality. In this work, by placing monetary interventions at
different positions in a task sequence (e.g. on switch tasks
or on repetition tasks), we intend to understand whether
performance-contingent financial rewards can incentivize
performance improvement through mitigating switch cost or
promoting faster learning and task specialization.
Goal setting. Informing a worker that performance-
contingent bonuses will be offered for selected tasks could
implicitly set a performance goal for the worker on all
tasks. There is a large literature on explicit goal setting
which demonstrates that setting specific and challenging
goals often leads to better performance (Locke et al. 1981;
Mento, Steel, and Karren 1987; Locke and Latham 2002)
and when the explicit goals are combined with monetary
incentives the performance may be further improved (Locke
et al. 1981; Pritchard and Curts 1973). It is thus interesting
to examine whether the implicit goals conveyed by monetary
interventions have a similar effect as the explicitly stated
goals. If they do, we expect that monetary interventions
affect worker performance on not only intervened but also
non-intervened tasks.
Experimental Design
Our experimental design is inspired by two classical
task switching experimental paradigms: predictable task
switching, where switches happen in a predictable way after
a constant number of tasks in a sequence, and task cuing,
where an explicit cue is presented before each task to specify
the type of the current task (Kiesel et al. 2010).
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Figure 1: An illustration of three treatments for the 24×4 sequence. S-NI denotes a switch task without monetary intervention,
R-NI represents a repetition task without monetary intervention, S-I refers to a switch task with monetary intervention, and R-I
is a repetition task with monetary intervention. The first task of a sequence is neither a switch nor a repetition task.
Tasks. Two types of tasks are used in our experiments: the
color naming task and the word reading task. In a task of
either type, a worker will see a stimuli word on the screen,
which is the name of one of the five colors, blue, green,
magenta, red and yellow. The word is displayed in a color
that may or may not match the word, but the color is also
limited to the five alternatives. For example, a stimuli word
“red” can be written in blue. The two types of tasks are:
• The color naming task (Color): A worker is asked to
indicate the color in which the word is written, regardless
of whether or not that matches the word itself. In the
above example, the answer is “blue”.
• The word reading task (Word): A worker is asked to
indicate what the word denotes, regardless of the color
it is written. In the above example, the answer is “red”.
In each task, the worker is instructed to report the answer by
typing the initial of it in lower case. For example, the worker
can report the answer “red” by typing ‘r’ on the keyboard.
Worker performance on each task is measured in two
dimensions:
• Reaction time (RT): The elapsed time between the onset
of the stimuli and the worker’s response.
• Accuracy (or correctness): A binary value indicating
whether the reported answer is correct or not.
These two metrics innately compete with each other as when
workers shorten their reaction time, they are likely to be less
accurate, ceteris paribus.
The two types of tasks were initially used in the Stroop
test, which revealed the Stroop effect, i.e. subjects generally
spend more time on naming the colors than reading
the words (Stroop 1935). They are now widely used by
psychologists in studying task switching (Wylie and Allport
2000; Gilbert and Shallice 2002; Allport and Wylie 1999).
Task Sequences. In our experiment, we put 96 tasks,
which include 48 tasks of each type, in a human intelligence
task (HIT). For different task sequences, the two types of
tasks switch at different frequencies.
Specifically, we define a “segment” in a sequence as a
consecutive chunk of tasks of the same type and the length
of a segment is the number of tasks in it. Thus, for our
experiment, if the length of each segment in a task sequence
is N, there are M = 96/N segments in that sequence, and the
sequence is then referred to as an N×M sequence. Different
types of tasks are assigned to neighboring segments in a
sequence. By varying segment lengths, we can control the
task switching frequency. We consider five task sequences
in our study: 4×24,8×12,16×6,24×4 and 48×2.
Intervention Treatments. Each worker is asked to com-
plete one of the five task sequences and receives a
performance-independent payment of 3 cents for each
task completed. Monetary interventions are performance-
contingent monetary rewards: a worker can earn an extra
bonus of 2 cents on a task with monetary intervention if her
reported answer for that task is correct and her reaction time
is less than 1 second. By varying whether and where the
additional bonuses are placed in a sequence, we create three
treatments for each of the five task sequences:
• No Bonus (baseline): No bonus is placed on any task in
a task sequence.
• Switch Bonus: Starting from the second segment in a task
sequence, a performance-contingent bonus is offered at
the first task in every segment, i.e. bonuses are placed at
all switch tasks.
• Repetition Bonus: Starting from the second segment
in a task sequence, a performance-contingent bonus is
offered at a randomly selected non-switch task in every
segment, i.e. a bonus is placed at one random repetition
task in each segment (except the first segment).
Figure 1 gives a graphical example of the three treatments.
We call a combination of a task sequence and an
intervention treatment an experiment condition. Thus, there
are 15 experiment conditions in our experiment.
Procedure. We post our HITs on MTurk on weekdays
around 12:00-14:00 and 16:00-18:00 (Eastern Standard
Time) in a week. To avoid network latency, we restrict
our HITs to U.S. workers. We suggest workers who have
difficulties in seeing colors or perceiving color differences
not take the HIT. Using a desktop or laptop computer with
a keyboard to complete the HIT is recommended. Each
worker is limited to take the HIT once (i.e. only work on
one sequence of 96 tasks).
Upon arrival, a worker is randomly assigned to an experi-
ment condition. The worker then goes through an instruction
page, a task and interface tutorial and a qualification test.
In the tutorial, the worker is instructed to report the answer
to each task as quickly and accurately as possible. If she is
assigned to a Switch Bonus or Repetition Bonus treatment,
she is also informed of the opportunities to earn extra
bonuses at some tasks in the sequence, contingent on her
answer in those tasks being correct and given within 1
second. The worker can only proceed to the actual task
sequence after passing the qualification test.
The actual task sequence starts with a task of a random
type. For each task in the sequence, the worker will first see a
cue word, either “Color” or “Word”, shown in white on gray
background and indicating whether the current task is the
color naming or the word reading task. For the Switch Bonus
and Repetition Bonus treatments, a bonus icon is displayed
together with the cue word if monetary intervention is placed
at the current task. Each cue is displayed for two seconds and
then the worker is automatically redirected to the task page,
where a stimuli word is displayed. Both the word and the
printing color of the stimuli are randomly chosen from the
five alternatives. The type of the current task is also shown
on the top of the task page in case of unawareness. Once
the worker reports her answer to the current task, she will
be automatically redirected to the cue page for the next task.
Finally, after completing all 96 tasks, the worker is asked to
complete a post-task survey of demographic information.
Each worker in our experiment gets a show-up fee of
$0.20 and a performance-independent payment of $2.88
($0.03×96) after submitting the HIT. Workers in Switch
Bonus and Repetition Bonus treatments may earn extra
bonuses depending on their performance in those tasks
where monetary interventions are placed.
Data
We recruited 1305 workers in total from MTurk for our
experiment. For each worker, we recorded: (1) the exact
experiment condition the worker worked on, including both
the task type and whether there was a monetary intervention
for each task in the sequence; (2) the worker’s reaction time
for each task; and (3) the worker’s accuracy for each task.
We noticed that some workers took an excessively long
time to report their answers to some tasks, which might due
to interruptions in their working environment. To eliminate
the influences of these “outliers”, we excluded the data
from a worker if her reaction time for any of the tasks in
her sequence was longer than 20 seconds. Such elimination
leaves us with 1268 valid workers. The data for these
workers are then used in the subsequent analysis.
The average age of the valid workers is 30.8, 59.1% of
them are male, and all of them use either a desktop or
a laptop computer to complete the HITs. No significant
demographic or equipment difference is observed for
workers in different experiment conditions.
Results
To analyze the effects of monetary interventions on worker
performance in task switching settings, we first examine
their influences on intervened tasks and non-intervened
tasks respectively. Then, we compare different experiment
conditions to gain insights into how monetary interventions
can be used most effectively in task switching settings.
In this section, we will use the same abbreviations (i.e.
S-NI, S-I, R-NI, R-I) as in Figure 1 to describe properties
of tasks. The Wilcoxon rank sum test is used to evaluate
statistical significance unless otherwise stated.
Effects on Intervened Tasks
Our first effort is to understand whether introducing mone-
tary interventions in a task switching setting can incentivize
workers to improve their performance on tasks where the
interventions are placed. We thus focus on comparing
worker performance on intervened tasks in treatments
with bonuses (i.e. Switch Bonus and Repetition Bonus
treatments) with worker performance on corresponding
tasks in the baseline treatment (i.e. No Bonus treatment).
We first analyze worker performance in terms of reaction
time. To represent the expected reaction time of workers
when there are no monetary interventions, five baseline
average reaction time sequences are created from our data
for the No Bonus treatment, one for each of the five task
sequences. That is, for each of the five task sequences of the
No Bonus treatment, we take all workers who worked on this
task sequence and average their reaction time position-wise.
For example, the value at position i in the baseline average
reaction time sequence for the 4× 24 sequence is obtained
by averaging the reaction time for the i-th task across all
workers of the 4×24 sequence in the No Bonus treatment.
Worker reaction time for intervened tasks in an ex-
periment condition with monetary interventions is then
compared with the values in the corresponding baseline
average reaction time sequence. For example, consider the
comparison between the No Bonus treatment and the Switch
Bonus treatment. For each of the five task sequences, we
use two buckets: the first bucket collects all intervened task
reaction time (i.e. S-I task reaction time) for all workers in
the Switch Bonus treatment for the task sequence, and for
each reaction time of a S-I task at position x that we add to
the first bucket, we put the reaction time value at position x in
the corresponding baseline average reaction time sequence
to the second bucket. We then calculate the average of
each bucket. Figure 2(a) plots the differences of the average
reaction time for the intervened tasks between the No Bonus
treatment and the Switch Bonus treatment for all five task
sequences. The differences in reaction time between the
No Bonus treatment and the Repetition Bonus treatment
are calculated similarly and plotted in Figure 2(d). As
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Figure 2: Effects of monetary interventions on reaction time for intervened tasks and non-intervened tasks. Error bars represent
standard errors of the mean.
the figures suggest, the presence of monetary interventions
leads to shorter reaction time for the intervened tasks, no
matter where the interventions are placed. Further statistical
tests report p<0.001 for pair-wise comparisons of all task
sequences, indicating that the decreases are significant.
We then examine worker performance in terms of
accuracy. Similar to the analysis on reaction time, for each of
the five task sequences, we first create the baseline average
accuracy sequences by taking all workers who worked on
the sequence in the No Bonus treatment and averaging their
accuracy position-wise. Then, for each worker who worked
on this sequence in the Switch Bonus (or Repetition Bonus)
treatment, we put her accuracy for each task into one of
the three categories depending on whether that task appears
before, at or after the placement of the monetary intervention
in its task segment. Furthermore, for each accuracy value
for a task at position x that we put into one of the three
categories for the Switch Bonus (or Repetition Bonus)
treatment, we also add the accuracy value at position x in
the corresponding baseline average accuracy sequence to
the same category for the No Bonus treatment. Finally, by
taking the average of all data in each category, we can
see in each treatment how accurate workers are before, at
or after the monetary interventions within a segment and
thus investigate whether worker’s accuracy improves in the
intervened tasks with the extra bonuses.
Figures 3(a) and 3(b) report how worker’s accuracy
changes within a segment for different treatments, with
Figure 3(a) showing the comparison between the No Bonus
treatment and the Switch Bonus treatment, and Figure 3(b)
showing the comparison between the No Bonus treatment
and the Repetition Bonus treatment. Accuracy is plotted
cumulatively: For example, in Figure 3(b), the average
worker accuracy after monetary interventions is the sum of
the average accuracy before interventions (green bar), the
accuracy increment at intervened tasks (orange bar) and the
accuracy increment after interventions (purple bar).
Figure 3(a) shows that the orange bar for the Switch
Bonus treatment is longer than that for the corresponding
No Bonus treatment, with the 4×24 sequence being the
only exception. This indicates that the average accuracy
at the switch tasks improves significantly (p<0.001) when
monetary interventions are placed on these tasks in all but
the 4×24 sequence. The exception of the 4×24 sequence
may because workers are overwhelmed by the mentally-
taxing frequent switches and thus find the additional bonuses
disturbing rather than motivating.
When monetary interventions are placed on repetition
tasks, the average accuracy at these tasks is often not higher
than that in the corresponding No Bonus treatment. To
see this, we compare the combined length of the green
and orange bars in Figure 3(b) for the Repetition Bonus
and No Bonus treatments. The combined length for the
Repetition Bonus treatment is shorter than that for the
corresponding No Bonus treatment (p<0.001), except for
the 48×2 sequence. However, the lower average accuracy
at intervened tasks for the Repetition Bonus treatment can
be largely attributed to the low average accuracy at the non-
intervened tasks before the intervention, i.e. the green bar
is shorter in the Repetition Bonus treatment than in the
corresponding No Bonus treatment for most sequences. This
is due to faster reaction on non-intervened tasks when extra
bonuses are used and the competition between reaction time
and accuracy, which we will detail in the next section. When
focusing on the accuracy improvement at intervened tasks
and thus comparing the length of orange bars between the
two treatments in Figure 3(b), we find that with monetary
interventions, the accuracy improvement at the intervened
repetition tasks is significantly larger for sequences with
moderate to low task switching frequencies (p<0.05).
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Figure 3: Comparison of the average worker accuracy within a segment
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Figure 4: Comparison of average worker performance for all 96 tasks in a sequence across different treatments. Error bars
represent standard errors of the mean.
To summarize, introducing monetary interventions incen-
tivizes better performance on intervened tasks — workers
complete the intervened tasks not only faster but also with
either higher accuracy or a larger accuracy improvement.
Recall that to earn the bonuses workers need to both
react quickly and be accurate. While it may be easy
for a worker to submit a response faster, the improved
performance in accuracy suggests that workers are indeed
motivated by the extrinsic financial incentives to improve
her performance along both dimensions. The incentives
to some degree help to overcome the innate tradeoff
between the two performance metrics. Since the extra
bonuses are placed on either switch tasks or repetition
tasks, our observation provides supporting evidence for the
effectiveness of performance-contingent financial rewards in
mitigating switch cost or promoting faster learning and task
specialization.
Effects on Non-intervened Tasks
Our next effort is to understand the effects of monetary
interventions on non-intervened tasks.
The comparisons of the average reaction time for non-
intervened tasks in the Switch Bonus treatment and the
Repetition Bonus treatment against that in the baseline No
Bonus treatment are displayed in Figure 2(b) and Figure 2(e)
respectively. Interestingly, we find that although workers
cannot earn extra rewards by completing the non-intervened
tasks quickly, they still show a clear tendency in shortening
their reaction time significantly (p<0.001) for these tasks.
On the other hand, while workers are still very accurate,
their accuracy decreases at the non-intervened tasks: for the
Switch Bonus treatment, the average worker accuracy for
non-intervened tasks is 93.75% across all task sequences,
which is slightly lower (by 0.74%) than that for the No
Bonus treatment; and for the Repetition Bonus treatment,
the average worker accuracy for non-intervened tasks across
all task sequences is 91.34%, which is 2.03% lower than
that for the No Bonus treatment. The accuracy decreases for
non-intervened tasks are statistically significant (p<0.001).
These results indicate that with the additional bonuses,
workers try to improve their performance in reaction time
while maintaining their performance in accuracy even when
monetary rewards are not directly applied to the tasks. Yet,
the competitive nature of the two performance metrics seems
to still dominate at non-intervened tasks, which means that
faster reaction comes with a cost in accuracy for these tasks.
As monetary interventions lead to decreases in reaction
time for both intervened and non-intervened tasks, we
further compare the magnitude of the decrease between
these two categories of tasks. Results are reported in
Figures 2(c) and 2(f). It is clear that no matter where the
monetary rewards are placed, the decrease in reaction time
for intervened tasks is significantly larger (p<0.05) than that
for non-intervened tasks, with the 48×2 sequence in the
Repetition Bonus treatment being the only exception (the
decrease in reaction time for non-intervened tasks there is
marginally larger, with p=0.077).
A unified explanation for our observations on both
intervened and non-intervened tasks is that workers first
interpret the performance-contingency of extra rewards on
some selected tasks as setting an implicit performance
goal, which has a similar effect as an explicit goal. Thus,
workers attempt to improve their performance for all tasks
in the sequence (subject to the innate tradeoff between the
two performance metrics), regardless of whether monetary
interventions are placed at the tasks. For the intervened
tasks in the sequence, workers are further incentivized by
the extrinsic financial incentives and therefore improve their
performance at these tasks to a larger degree by responding
Table 1: Average worker reaction time in different experiment conditions and differences of reaction time between conditions.
The statistical significance of the Wilcoxon rank sum test is marked as a superscript, with *, **, and *** representing significance
levels of 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 respectively. (Unit: seconds)
Task Sequences Reaction Time Mean Values Reaction Time Differences
No Bonus (NB) Switch Bonus (SB) Repetition Bonus (RB) SB – NB RB – NB RB – SB
4×24 1.5078 1.3628 1.3193 -0.145*** -0.188*** -0.044***
8×12 1.4355 1.2625 1.2893 -0.173*** -0.146*** 0.027
16×6 1.3904 1.1717 1.2615 -0.218*** -0.129*** 0.090***
24×4 1.2731 1.1976 1.1824 -0.075*** -0.091*** -0.015
48×2 1.2261 1.0725 1.0352 -0.154 -0.191*** -0.037***
Table 2: Average worker accuracy in different experiment conditions and differences of accuracy between conditions. The
statistical significance of the Wilcoxon rank sum test is marked as a superscript, with *, **, and *** representing significance
levels of 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 respectively.
Task Sequences Accuracy Mean Values Accuracy Differences
No Bonus (NB) Switch Bonus (SB) Repetition Bonus (RB) SB – NB RB – NB RB – SB
4×24 0.9617 0.9193 0.9193 -0.042*** -0.042*** 0.000
8×12 0.9395 0.9353 0.9178 -0.004*** -0.022*** -0.018***
16×6 0.9442 0.9248 0.9034 -0.019*** -0.041*** -0.021***
24×4 0.9370 0.9458 0.9104 0.009* -0.027*** -0.036***
48×2 0.8973 0.9164 0.9163 0.019*** 0.019*** -0.000
faster and more accurately.
More Effective Interventions
Finally, we seek to gain some insights into how to more
effectively use monetary interventions in a task switching
setting when we care worker performance on all tasks.
Figure 4(a) and Table 1 report the comparisons of the
three treatments in terms of the average worker reaction
time over all 96 tasks for each of the five task sequences.
Figure 4(b) and Table 2 present similar comparisons for
worker accuracy.
First, we look into the baseline No Bonus treatment.
As shown in Figures 4(a) and 4(b), when monetary
interventions are not available, as task switching becomes
less frequent, worker reaction time gets shorter and worker
accuracy also exhibits a downward trend. One-way analysis
of variance (ANOVA) further confirms that the differences
in reaction time and accuracy across task sequences are
statistically significant (p<0.001). In other words, without
monetary interventions, by controlling how frequently tasks
switch in a sequence, a requester may trade off better
performance in average reaction time for better performance
in overall accuracy.
When comparing worker performance in treatments with
additional bonuses (i.e. the Switch Bonus or Repetition
Bonus treatment) and that in the baseline treatment, we
have an interesting observation: while workers can be
incentivized to improve their performance in reaction time
significantly regardless of the task switching frequency in
the sequences (i.e. negative differences in columns “SB –
NB” and “RB – NB” of Table 1), similar improvement
in accuracy can only be achieved when the task switching
frequency is low (i.e. positive differences in columns “SB
– NB” and “RB – NB” of Table 2 only for sequences with
a low task switching frequency). This observation implies
that adding monetary interventions to sequences with a low
task switching frequency could be more effective: instead
of trading off speed for accuracy or vice versa, workers
perform better according to both metrics; in particular the
incentives boost worker’s overall accuracy in the sequence
significantly.
Next, we consider where to place monetary interventions
in a task sequence and examine worker performance in
Switch Bonus treatment and Repetition Bonus treatment.
We find that while both treatments have similar efficiency
in improving performance in reaction time, placing the
performance-contingent rewards on switch tasks generally
leads to better performance in accuracy compared to provid-
ing extra bonuses at repetition tasks (i.e. negative differences
in the “RB – SB” column of Table 2). This indicates that it is
more efficienct to use monetary interventions right at the the
switching points. With a closer look, this phenomenon can
be attributed to two reasons: (1) accuracy improvement at
the intervened tasks is significantly larger when bonuses are
placed at switch tasks than when they are placed at repetition
tasks (+3.49% vs. +0.34%, p<0.001); (2) combining extra
bonuses with task switches makes workers focus more on
the new type of tasks earlier — compared to the baseline
treatment, the average number of tasks it takes for a worker
to first submit a correct answer in a segment is decreased
by 0.18 (not significant) for the Switch Bonus treatment
while increased by 0.15 (p<0.05) for the Repetition Bonus
treatment, leading workers in the Switch Bonus treatment to
outperform workers in the Repetition Bonus treatment in the
early stage of each task segment (e.g. 88.52% vs. 85.30% for
the average accuracy comparison of the first half of tasks in
each segment, p<0.001).
In sum, monetary interventions can be most effective in
motivating better worker performance when they are placed
at switch tasks in a sequence with a low task switching
frequency. We conjecture that this is due to that monetary
interventions are less interruptive in sequences with a low
task switching frequency and the demand for extra attention
is highest at switch tasks.
Conclusions
We experimentally study the effects of monetary inter-
ventions on worker performance in crowdsourcing task
switching settings. We show that the occasional provided
performance-contingent monetary rewards in a task se-
quence not only lead to an improved performance in the
intervened tasks, but also cast a spillover effect on the non-
intervened tasks. Such observations can be explained as that
workers are motivated by both the implicit performance goal
conveyed by the performance contingency of the bonuses
and the extrinsic financial incentives. Finally, we find that
monetary interventions are more effective in eliciting better
worker performance when used at switch tasks in a sequence
with a low task switching frequency.
The practical implication of our results is that in
crowdsourcing task switching settings, monetary rewards
can be an effective method for motivating high-quality
work. Yet, the effectiveness of monetary interventions may
depend on both the exact sequences that the interventions are
applied to and the places that the interventions are provided
at. Requesters need to consider these subtleties when trying
to improve the quality of crowd work.
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